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Introduction: A Founding Father and His View of the World
(after Kant)
Kant was born, thought, and died. It seems that not much has changed since 
then, since he walked the earth. Unaltered, each new day the sun rises. And 
afterwards it again sets. Each and every day it is the same procedure. The world, 
after Kant: still business as usual. But where does this certainty come from that 
the sun will unalterably rise again on each new day? As most readers will know, 
this question might also be formulated in a more technical manner as follows: 
How can one, starting from the experiences of seemingly stable relations be-
tween cause and effect (the day begins, the sun rises) infer a certain conviction 
that the content of these already made experiences (relations between cause 
and effect) can be generalized to a legitimate, stable, and lawful relation? And 
this is ultimately to say: How can one, starting from experiences of past con-
catenations of cause and effect, derive future concatenations? These questions 
formulate an epistemological problem that became famous in the history of phi-
1 This title of the present article is motivated by a diagnosis of the contemporary present that 
was formulated by Alain Badiou. The diagnosis runs as follows: We are today in a comparable 
situation like Marx was in the 1840s (we thus have to prove anew the validity of the hypoth-
esis of emancipation). Cf. Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, London / New York 2010: 
Verso, pp. 66–67, 258–259. I share this diagnostic stance and its implications. Badiou had al-
ready stated something along these very lines in his 1985 Peut-on penser la politique?, where 
he claimed that it is precisely the worldwide crisis of Marxism which necessitates the rewriting 
of the Communist Manifesto. If Badiou’s diagnosis is correct, then it would not only imply that 
the Communist Manifesto, but also the Theses on Feuerbach, “The Holy Family”, would need 
to be redone. This insight motivates the present article. Obviously, I can here maximally pres-
ent certain outlines of such an endeavour. My first much shorter reflections in this direction 
were also presented in: Frank Ruda, Die spekulative Familie, in: Texte zur Kunst, June 2012, Vol. 
86, pp. 172–176.
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losophy under the name “the problem of induction”2 and was formulated by the 
pre-Kantian philosopher David Hume. 
It may come as no surprise that today this question is rarely recalled, rarely 
taken up as a true and pressing question, not withstanding if one likes to call 
oneself a philosopher or not. This is not because it has been proven at some 
point that Hume and his problems belong in the museum of history (although 
there are some who seem to believe this). Rather it is because, as Adorno once 
remarked, the history of philosophy is full of problems that have been forgot-
ten.3 We who have been born after Kant, think (if we think) in the same way Kant 
did that the access to the concatenations of cause and effect and to the absolute 
lawfulness and regularity of nature, that is to say: that cognition of how things 
are in themselves, in their absolute nature, independent from us – cannot be ob-
tained. At least it seems that such an alleged and all-relativizing dis-absolutiza-
tion of thought, i.e. an exiling of the absolute from the realm of thought, is what 
came into the world with Kant. And at least this is one of the most fundamental 
claims of a more or less new philosophical movement or group (which wants to 
be neither the former nor the latter) that became a talking point some time ago: 
2 If one shares its premises (that is to say, how to get from experience to the inference of stable 
laws) this is truly a problem. I therefore agree with Quentin Meillassoux – the philosopher I 
will primarily be dealing with in the present article – that one cannot as easily do away with 
it as certain thinkers like Karl R. Popper or in a different manner even Nelson Goodman con-
tended. Cf. David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Oxford 1888: Clarendon Press, pp. 89, 
180; David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principle of 
Morals, Oxford 1975: Clarendon Press; Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast, Cambridge 
1955: Harvard University Press, pp. 72–75; Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New 
York 1959: Basic Books, pp. 253–254, 315. Why is that? Because: not only any particular sunrise 
(any particular experience) becomes problematic, but what is put in the spotlight is the very 
relation from any particular (experiential) case to any future generalization (in terms of law). 
The problem is thus fundamentally related to the legitimacy of inductively developing any sort 
of lawfulness of (and within) appearances.
3 Adorno’s precise diagnosis was that the whole history of philosophy is in some sense the his-
tory of forgetting problems, questions, or ideas that once seemed pressing and agitating and 
then lost significance, only to re-appear later within the same history in a renewed context 
and guise. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Metaphysics. Concepts and Problems (1965), Stanford 2001: 
Stanford University Press pp. 65ff.
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so-called speculative realism.4 I will here mainly deal with one of its founding 
fathers. Let us call him the speculative realist.5
The speculative realist thinks that some things changed – to be more precise: 
all things in themselves become-other for thought – with Kant. And this change 
was not a change for the better. As peculiar and at the same time refreshing such 
a philosophical label may appear today, since it is hard to imagine an increase 
in the counter-current (realism and furthermore a speculative one) in times of 
an omnipresent hegemony of analytic philosophy, so peculiar and discordant 
are also the different projects of its proponents regarding what this label might 
mean.6 But at least with some vulgarization or generalization two gestures can 
4 The “speculative realism“ label dates back to a conference which was held in 2007 at Gold-
smith College in London. Its proponents, well known to the reader, were primarily: Quentin 
Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, Graham Harman, and Iain Hamilton Grant. For an overview, see 
also: The Speculative Turn. Continental Materialism and Realism, ed. by Levi Bryant, Nick Sr-
nicek, and Graham Harman, Melbourne 2011: re-press. Hereinafter cited as ST. The debate on 
whether there is a group under this name or not is mentioned in: Graham Harman, On the 
Undermining of Objects: Grant, Bruno and Radical Philosophy, in: ST, pp. 21-40. Hereinafter 
cited as GHO.
5 I mainly refer to what Quentin Meillassoux, one of if not the founding father thereof, devel-
ops in his impressive: After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, London / New 
York 2008: Continuum.
6 A short – and as I reckon rather unfair – remark regarding Harman and Grant: Harman seeks 
to put objects (again) into the centre of a renewed foundation of ontology. Why? Because that 
which has been forgotten within occidental thought – more or less throughout its history – is 
the object, the object as an actant. Therefore he seems to agree with Heidegger: we, the West-
erners, forgot something and we even forgot that we forgot. And, that which is the centre of 
what we forgot is the object(s). If Harman’s renewal of ontology – the idea he also seems to 
share with Grant – consists in treating “the inanimate world as a philosophical protagonist” 
(GHO, 25) and in defending the claim that “[t]he object is what is autonomous but not entirely 
autonomous, since it exists in permanent tension with all those realities that are meant to 
replace it completely” (GHO, 39), this seems to me to be quite a problematic move. To make 
a long story short: It seems that Harman asserts that there is an object of being but this very 
object (maybe even objects) does not embody being. It is not an objective object, not objective 
objects, he is referring to. Rather he seems to assert that there is something at what being itself 
aims at, an “object” (of desire) of being itself (like an object a of being causing being to be what 
it is). This is why these objects act for him in one way or another. And they are at the same time 
(being) covered up, repressed, etc. Being itself has its own object a and this is what Harman 
refers to under the category of “object”. As surprising as this might sound, my reservation con-
cerns this (somehow purely) rhetorical twist from the “being of the object” to the “object(s) of 
being”. For even if this does not imply that “being” and “object(s)” are equated (which would 
consequentially simply render the concept of the “object” meaningless), it implies that there 
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be discerned in all of them. On one hand, they claim in a nearly Heideggerian 
manner that amongst other things, or first and foremost with Kant, modern 
thought enters into oblivion. Modern (philosophical) thought forgets precisely 
what was still present within it with Descartes, Locke, as well as Hume. On the 
other hand, this oblivion is elucidated in a way that would have given the creeps 
to a huge fraction of philosophers – from Heidegger up to Critical theory, from 
Kant to the Frankfurt School. For what this forgetting forgets is the discourse of 
science, or to be more precise: that science thinks.
 
1. With Kant all Things Come Under the Yoke of Correlation
If Descartes was still able to distinguish between the primary and secondary 
properties of an object – between the properties the things have in themselves 
and independent from us, and those that they have when and because they ap-
pear to us and that are hence properties that correlate with the being-observed 
by an observer – with, after, and because of Kant thought is afflicted by an 
 
is something like “a cause” or even “a truth of being” that lies in its “object(s)”. Simply put: 
There is an objective truth of (the) being (of everything that is) since being is what it is because 
of its object(s). From this simple (and I contend, rather rhetorical) reversal, one can easily 
start reflecting on the “objective sciences” as bearer of the truth of “being”. As to what I can 
see with regard to this enterprise, I think that its basic premises are very close to being a mere 
sophism. I think this can be best grasped in: Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the 
Metaphysics of Objects, Illinois 2002: Open Court Publishing. Grant proposes some sort of 
Schellingian renewal of an Aristotelian metaphysics of (natural) force(s), turning its focus to 
the “powers always at work, always intrinsic to “any “formative process”. [Cf. Iain Hamilton 
Grant, Mining Conditions: A Response to Harman, in: ST, pp. 41–46; his neo-vitalism comes 
out even more clearly in: Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, London 
2006: Continuum.] He argues for a primordial, pre-individual constancy of production.(Min-
ing Conditions, p. 45) One gets the same thing that one gets with Harman only that the focus 
is not even on the “object(s) of being” but on the formation – which seen in the clear light of 
day is pretty much the same thing. For Grant asserts that that which produces and its prod-
ucts can no longer be distinguished. As both insist that their take on what the sciences do is 
utterly materialist (against any idealist forgetting of the object or of the productive powers 
at work), I agree here with Adrian Johnston that “conceding the form of an interminable and 
unwinnable epistemological debate is itself idealist.”(Adrian Johnston, Hume’s Revenge. À 
Dieux Meillassoux, in: ST, p. 112; hereinafter cited as AJHR) I consider both projects in Ba-
diousian terms to be but– perhaps rigorous and systematic – examples of sophistry. The first 
is an objective, the latter a vitalist metaphysics. Rendered differently, I have trouble seeing – 
accepting the coordinates of their own arguments – why what both end up with is not pre-
cisely what they would call idealism.
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absolutization of the secondary qualities of the object. Hand in hand with this 
goes a disabsolutization of thought since it no longer has access to the primary 
qualities. The things, the world, reality, and nature are only there with and 
after Kant for us, as a correlate to our existence. Paradigmatically, one can rec-
ognize this in the Kantian exiling of the thing in itself from the realm of the 
knowable and cognizable. With and after Kant modern thought thinks that 
the distinction between our mind-dependent and concept-dependent access to 
reality, on one hand, and reality as it is as such, on the other, is a difference 
within the mind, a difference within the concept. Such a (post-)Kantian posi-
tion is attacked by speculative realism with the label “correlationalism”, whose 
founding manoeuvre can be well described in quite simple terms: it takes the 
concept of difference (for example, between concept and thing) to be a (mere) 
conceptual difference.7 Correlationalism is clever, even reflected ignorance (of 
things as they are in themselves).8 Its paradigm is what Kant called “critique”. It 
limits things to their being-thought, it limits thought to being itself and thereby 
absolutizes limitation (via correlation). Correlationalism is thus an oblivious 
metaphysics of (hypostatized) finitude.
7 To my mind, this argument was presented in a fascinating manner by one of the most inno-
vative and rigorous thinkers somehow associated with the label of “speculative realism“: Ray 
Brassier. Cf. His Concepts and Objects, in: ST, pp. 57–64. Yet, one has to note here, against the 
reiterated attack of some speculative realists on Hegel, that this argument is in its entirety a 
Hegelian one. When Hegel introduces the notion of difference, he is very explicit what one gets 
with it. It is not only another notion but it is a notion that is, one might say, self-applicative. 
When one reaches the concept of “difference” what one also gets is the idea that there is even a 
difference to the conceptual that becomes thinkable (this is the self-application of the concept 
of difference onto the conceptual realm as such; it introduces a difference). Thus it is not just 
another concept or notion, but a concept which entails more than just what is conceptual, i.e. 
the difference to the concept is implied in the concept of difference. 
8 At the same time what should be clear – as is certainly known to readers of Meillassoux’s 
work – is that in dis-absolutizing the capacity of thought, correlationalism absolutizes the cor-
relation (even more in a certain sense even its contingency). The most straightforward account 
of this can be found in: Quentin Meillassoux, Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative 
Analysis of the Meaningless Sign (Workshop Paper, Berlin 2012, unpublished; hereinafter cited 
as QMIRR). Reconstructing correlationalism in this manner somehow is part of overcoming 
correlationalism from within (for Meillassoux thinks this is the only option). That this is not an 
uncontroversial claim can be seen in Ray Brassier, Concepts and Objects, pp. 59–65.
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2. Science thinks9
If Descartes – effectively the philosopher of the scientific Copernican turn – was 
still able, with his distinction between primary and secondary qualities of ob-
jects, to allocate mathematics a constitutive role within (ontology but also) epis-
temology, since it was capable of recognizing and presenting the properties of 
the things in themselves, this is precisely what is denied with and after Kant. 
It is as if with and after Kant the primary qualities of things, of the world, and 
so on, are simply forgotten, repressed. One might say: With and after Kant the 
being of objects – das Ding – is forgotten and we are simply dealing with ob-
jects (of and in our world). This is a specific form of oblivion with regard to the 
ontological difference. The consequence of this is: science presents knowledge 
(of the things or us) for us. But it is also by this very move that, according to the 
speculative realist, certain scientific statements and their true content become 
consequentially incomprehensible for any correlationalist. If, for example, sci-
ence talks about the existence of the world before the origin of consciousness, 
the correlationalist is unable to understand these “ancestral” (Meillassoux) 
statements in the way that they should be understood. He does not interpret 
them as what they are: statements about the absence of correlation or of any 
sort of givenness (for example, of objects for a consciousness) in general, but 
he rather interprets them as statements about the absence of the correlation in 
correlation with consciousness. The correlationalist is only able to understand 
claims that refer to something before the emergence of consciousness and thus 
to the absence of consciousness only as claims about the absence for conscious-
ness.10 Correlationalism implies in this sense always a misconception of the very 
9 I owe this adorable and firmly Anti-Heideggerian formula to an unpublished text by Rado 
Riha.
10 As consistent and crucial as this criticism of (post-)critical thought concerning science is 
or at least might appear to be, that much does it come with the danger of a quite problematic 
Stalinist twist: Against the wrong ideological usurpation of science(s) one opposes a philo-
sophically (i.e. ideologically) ensured, that is to say, materialist position. The latter implies: 
The sciences or scientists themselves have to be educated in order to take the right ideological 
position. Not surprisingly, the educator is he who endorses the correct philosophical position. 
In a peculiar combination two claims are thus put forth at the same time: one needs to take 
the sciences seriously; the sciences/scientists need to be educated by he who knows how to 
educate them to understand that they need to neglect any wrong ideological utilization. Ed 
Pluth also touches upon some aspects of this in his contribution to this volume.  
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scientificity of science because it ultimately implies a (sophistically versed) ver-
sion of a metaphysics of presence (of consciousness).
3. Speculative Revolution: Absolutizing Contingency
The speculative realist knows that after Kant one cannot simply return to a state 
before the fall (i.e. the Kantian Copernican Revolution). The taking of positions 
cannot simply be: Hume or Kant, not even: Descartes or Kant. This is why he 
executes a daring speculative manoeuvre that is supposed to enable him on one 
hand to avoid resolving the difference of concept and thing in the concept of 
difference and, on the other hand, with this very move he seeks to comprehend 
scientific statements as statements about the subject-independent real being of 
things.11 Within this he attempts to turn Hume’s epistemological misery into an 
ontological virtue.12 This is supposed to mean that the answer to Hume is pre-
cisely what appeared to be his problem: One can think the nature, the essence, 
the qualities of the things in themselves, but these qualities have a very peculiar 
characteristic. The speculative realist opts against all forms of correlationalism 
for an (ontological) absolutization of the primary qualities13 and through their 
particularity seeks to defend a (renewed speculative realist) absolutization of 
thought. The speculative realist contends against Kant that the absolute can be 
thought, but at the same time contends also against Descartes that the peculiar 
11 One would have to demonstrate in greater detail how at least Meillassoux, with his own 
elaboration of the (Badiousian) thesis that it is precisely mathematics that can overcome the 
very form of a subject-dependent discourse and is hence able to grasp and formalize the abso-
lute outside of any discourse, is ultimately led to claim that there is “something” within this 
absolute, within the things in themselves, that correlates with the universal (and subject-inde-
pendent) discourse of mathematics. To put this differently: the speculative realist Meillassoux 
replaces the subject-object correlation with a mathematics-things-in-themselves correlation 
which finally implies (at least up to a certain and quite crucial degree) the discursive nature of 
nature itself. As much as I am unconvinced by the correlationalism that Meillassoux criticizes, 
that much does his version of speculative-realist correlationalism not convince me. I owe this 
interpretation of Meillassoux’s work to a brilliant article by Alenka Zupančič, Realism in Psy-
choanalysis (unpublished typescript). This criticism also resonates in a formula introduced 
by Adrian Johnston: “What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible.” (AJHR, 134)
12 For this, see: AJHR and Peter Hallward, Anything is Possible. A Reading of Quentin Meillas-
soux’s After Finitude, in: ST, pp. 130–141. Hereinafter cited as PWAP.
13 Meillassoux thus contends that the very “being of every thing is its contingency”. (QMIRR) 
Being qua being hence becomes “peut-être”. See also: Quentin Meillassoux, Speculative Real-
ism, in: Collapse, Vol. 3., 2007, p. 393.
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nature of it necessitates not thinking that which is but that which can be. What 
is absolute and has to be as the primary quality of all things is that they can 
be other than they are. This Otherness of all things, that is to say: contingency 
becomes the primary quality of everything that there is. Contingency is primary, 
what is primary is contingent.
The primary quality is subject-independent because things are the way they are – 
for example, they appear to us in the way they appear to us – but they could be 
different as there is no reason why they are the way they are. Thus, the way we 
experience things only tells us one thing about things: that we know nothing 
about how things really are. Simply put: what has to be thought as being abso-
lute is that everything can be other, different than it is. Here one can see how 
the ontologizing inversion of Hume14 concerns the status of each and every law 
(thinkable). One can render this not only as an inversion of Hume but also: 1. 
As an inversion of Descartes: Since Descartes famously doubted everything that 
deceived him in order to gain absolute certainty. Might one not also be quite 
tempted to suggest that what this speculative realist manoeuvre comes down 
to is that the absolute character of all things is (experiential) deception? That is 
to say: does this not amount to claiming that things can deceive us because the 
only thing we know for sure is that for no reason whatsoever everything can be 
other than it is and this very insight is precisely the insight into the in itself of the 
thing as such? Is not contingency an ontological name for an ontologized posi-
tivization of the very Cartesian idea of experiential deception? 2. As an inversion 
of Kant: Since Kant, according to the speculative realist, asserted that things in 
themselves are beyond the reach of what is epistemologically knowable to us. 
But with this very move Kant asserts the existence of something that we cannot 
know. But does not the speculative realist manoeuvre amount to the claim that 
the very unknowability of things in themselves is not an epistemological barrier, 
but an ontological, i.e. absolute, character of things as such?15 Could one not – if 
one were to be Kantian – simply raise the following question: Why is contin-
gency not simply another (even rather restricted) name for the claim that Kant 
articulated when he stated that the thing in itself is unknowable, uncognizable? 
Maybe he articulated this epistemologically, but do the consequences of this 
claim not come quite close to what the speculative realist claims ontologically? 
14 Cf. AJHR, p. 95.
15 If this were to be true, the speculative realist would make a lot of noise about another es-
sentially Hegelian insight. 
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I will leave all these questions aside for the moment. Now, to return to the 
above-stated in different terms: Science proves, if understood correctly for the 
speculative realist, that there is no proof of any necessity which makes things 
(and the laws they obey, be it a natural law or other) the way they are – and 
this is a thesis not about us and our relation to things, but about the things in 
themselves. Science proves in different ways always and ever again the improv-
ability of necessity (of the way things are right now). The absolute quality of all 
things, of all objects, and of nature, etc., is hence that they necessarily can be 
otherwise. This means also: everything that can be different is contingently how 
it is. The absolute that science allows one to think, according to the speculative 
realist, is the non-necessity of necessity and with it the necessity of contingency.
4. Realists De-Totalizing the Possible
The speculative realist draws one essential consequence from this primary qual-
ity of all things, from the insight into this version of the absolute character of 
everything. Besides Kant, another (metaphysical-correlationalist) enemy enters 
the scene here: Leibniz.16 The speculative realist considers the Leibnizian prin-
ciple of sufficient reason17 to be the systematic (and importantly: metaphysical) 
anti-principle to his own position. But this principle nonetheless delineates the 
very coordinates of the argumentative framework within which the speculative 
realist can launch the strike against this new opponent. The speculative realist 
asserts that the very lack of any sufficient reason and principle is precisely tak-
ing up the role of the only principle (which cannot be one) of all things. Again 
simply put: Taking up Leibniz and inverting him, the speculative realist claims 
that the only sufficient reason for things to be how they are is that there is no 
sufficient reason for them to be how they are at all.18 Again one can see that the 
central methodological procedure is the procedure of inversion (from problem 
to solution). At this point Meillassoux introduces the distinction between meta-
16 On this point Meillassoux basically seems to give a different formulation to the criticism 
of Leibniz as a proponent of “constructability”, which was first systematically elaborated by 
Alain Badiou. See: Alain Badiou, Being and Event, London / New York 2006: Continuum, pp. 
315–326.
17 As is well known, this principle simply states: Nothing is without a cause or reason why it 
is (how it is). 
18 At least Meillassoux thinks that this leads to “a world emancipated from the Principle of Suf-
ficient Reason.” Cf. Quentin Meillassoux, Potentiality and Virtuality, in: ST, pp. 226. Hereinafter 
cited as QMPV. 
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physics and speculation. As he puts it: “For I call ‘speculative’ any philosophy 
that claims to accede to an absolute. But I call ‘metaphysical’ any speculation 
that claims to accede to the absolute according to a more or less extended mo-
dality of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The Principle of Sufficient Reason 
consists, in its minimal form, in affirming that existent things have a necessary 
reason to be as they are rather than otherwise.” (QMIRR) Simply put, metaphy-
sicians (irrationally) believe in the principle of sufficient reason and this very 
belief (which has no proper logical ground) thus becomes a synonym for irra-
tionality or systematic inconsistency. Implied in it is a belief (in the principle) 
that is fundamentally driven by the power not to know.19 What the speculative 
realist contends against such a position is that knowledge should succeed and 
metaphysics should in some sense be overcome. Since metaphysics – this is one 
of the consequences of the speculative realist rationalism – in the last instance 
becomes synonymous with irrationality and inconsistency.20
To render this in different terms: The speculative realist contends that Hume’s 
problem is a true problem; hence one has to draw the most radical consequenc-
es from it. And hence these consequences have to relate to the very foundation 
and persistence of laws (within the realm of nature tout court). This is why and 
where Georg Cantor’s “Continuum Hypothesis” enters the picture. The argument 
runs, “taken together, Hume and Cantor” (AJHR, 134), as follows: if the being of 
every thing is necessarily contingent (this is its absolute quality), then there can 
be no law which is exempt from this very contingency. Because laws formulate 
the relation between radically contingent things this means that they could be 
19 And as one might argue: the most fundamental discipline in which there is a belief that 
hinders logical consistency, but obfuscates that it does so, is religion (or ideology). Correla-
tionalism is not simply metaphysical but also ideological in this precise sense. This is already 
the argument of the early Marx. For this, see, for example, my review of the work of Simon 
Critchley at http://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviewofbooks/reviews/2012/593.
20 Yet, thus far there is no account – with the exception of some comments on the ideological 
atmosphere (which could also be related to what I stated in the footnote above) of correlation-
alism [For this see also: Alberto Toscano, Against Speculation, or, a Critique of the Critique of 
Critique: A Remark on Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude (After Colletti), in: ST, pp. 84–91] 
– of why there is this sort of metaphysical irrationalism. Is it just a failure in reasoning? Is it ra-
tionalist philosophy being attacked by irrational sophists or ideological enemies (who tend to 
apologetically defend what is)? Or is there some sort of spontaneous metaphysics of everyday 
life, some sort of ordinary spontaneous irrationalism (letting us believe in an anti-Humeian 
manner that there is a cause for all things) that needs to be countered – and perhaps can never 
be abolished in general? 
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other than they are, thus: the existence of any law itself is contingent. What this 
then means is that one cannot infer any probable set of cases when things (and 
the laws describing their relations) will change. The speculative realist thereby 
envisages a “contingency so radical that it would incorporate all conceivable 
futures of the present laws, including that consisting in the absence of modifica-
tion.” (QMPV, 226) If Hume’s problem of induction thus concerned the actuality 
and effectivity of any law thinkable (its instalment as much as its maintenance), 
the consequence that can be drawn from its positivized ontologization is that it 
is a completely rational and consistent stance to consider the way the world is 
fully devoid of any reason whatsoever. But, and here comes the catch, why then 
do the laws under which we live not change permanently?
The answer to this question is another cornerstone in the speculative realist ar-
gumentative rationalist fortress. Why? Because, it leads him to deny the ratio-
nality (and consistency) of any form of probabilistic or stochastic reasoning.21 
What this is supposed to mean can be rendered intelligible in the following way: 
The assumption that the insight into the absolutely contingent origin of any law 
(and any thing) existing in the given world allows inferring any probability of it 
changing, is simply a wrong assumption, a mistaken inference. Why? Because 
thinking the absolute (the contingency of everything that there is) does not im-
ply that one can infer from it any state of the world which is more probable than 
another. It is, as the speculative realist claims, simply not true that from such 
a contingency one could derive a necessary or probable frequency of change 
within the laws (and things) of the world. The speculative realist slogan for this 
is: “One needs to detotalize the possible.” (QMPV, 231) This is precisely where 
Georg Cantor can help. 
5. Fighting the Metaphysics (of the Probable)
Cantor demonstrated that there cannot be a set of all sets, an infinity encom-
passing all sizes of infinity.22 This can be applied here in the following way: Since 
21 Again put in more direct terms: Probabilism and stochastic calculation is metaphysics (in 
mathematics). 
22 A far too simple two-step account of Cantor’s mathematical revolution can be given in the 
following way: 1. Consider the everyday intuition that the set of all prime numbers seems to 
be a part of the set of natural numbers. Yet whilst being a part thereof, one can clearly see 
that both are infinite. Cantor demonstrated that one can compare the size of these two infinite 
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everything is contingent, one cannot even start from a given – even infinite– 
number of stable coordinates or elements from which one then could derive a 
(series of) case(s) that is (are) more probable than any other. Simply put: It is not 
that X (a law, a thing) has contingent properties, it is that the very existence of 
X is contingent. Therefore the very existence of X cannot be presupposed. Put 
into a broader context: If the existence of X1 is contingent and the existence of 
X2 is contingent, the very existence of the law determining their relation also 
has to be considered to be contingent. This radical contingency is what can be 
deciphered as the absolute character of things. If things can be different, laws 
depicting their relationships are necessarily contingent, too. 
Hence, as soon as one tries to argue for a stability or instability of the given laws, 
one takes these very laws to be something like a constant (which, as the spec-
ulative realist insists, they are not).23 Probabilism relies on at least one thing: 
the stability of a given set of elements, even though there might be infinitely 
many and even though the ways of combining these elements are even greater 
in terms of infinity (and even while arguing for a necessarily implied possibility 
of change to take place). In order to be put to work, probabilistic reason needs a 
fixed set of elements from which it can derive (more or less) probable (possible) 
actualizations. Probabilism calculates via totalizing the possible (cases that po-
sets by assigning each number of each set a place in an order of elements of the same set. 
One can thereby prove if for any place of a number of a set there is a corresponding number 
in the second. In this case, number 1 takes the first place in the order of natural number, 2 the 
second, and ad infinitum; the order in the set of prime numbers assigns to the first places the 
numbers 1, 3,5,7, continuing ad infinitum. By proving that for each number in the set of natural 
numbers there is a corresponding number in the set of prime numbers, Cantor proved that 
the set of primes and natural numbers are of the same size (power), yet they are both infinite. 
He thus proved that sizes of infinity can be compared. 2. In using the axiom of the power set, 
Cantor demonstrated that from each given set one can construct a set whose size is greater 
than the size of the original set (the power set axiom, radically simplified, entails all the ways 
in which the elements of the given set can be combined, and as there are always more ways of 
combining elements than there are elements, one can construct a greater set). Thus, starting 
from the set of natural numbers he was able to demonstrate that there has to be a set of greater 
infinity (and this continues infinitely) and at the same time he demonstrated the bi-univocal 
equating of places and numbers does not work for all infinite sets (the set of real numbers is 
larger than the set of natural numbers; the whole question is then by how much). For a more 
adequate account of this, cf. Shaughan Lavine, Understanding the Infinite, Harvard 1998: Har-
vard University Press.
23 The inversion taking place here is that even when one argues for (more or less probable) 
change (of things or laws), one can rely on a presupposition that is wrong (i.e. metaphysical).
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tentially actualize); speculative realism does not calculate but assumes to have 
demonstrated that (probabilist) calculation starts from irrational, unscientific, 
i.e. metaphysical assumptions. De-totalizing the possible amounts to claiming 
that the emergence of something new due to fully contingent reasons (that is: 
due to no reasons at all) has to be conceived of as an emergence ex nihilo which 
in the act of its emergence creates its own possibility.24 By showing that any 
probabilist calculation of change or stability (of the given laws of things) pre-
supposes something that cannot be presupposed (i.e. a pre-existing set of possi-
ble cases that then actualize contingently), the speculative realist gets rid of any 
idea of a totality of the possible by subtracting any prior existence. For the prob-
abilist metaphysician, it is the actualization of a possibility that is contingent. 
Against this the speculative realist begins by drawing consequences from the 
following axiom: contingency precedes existence.25 This comes down to claim-
ing that “anything is possible,”26 even the abolishment of contingency (and the 
24 The reach of this argument has been noted most precisely by Slavoj Žižek. Cf. his Less Than 
Nothing. Hegel and the Spectre of Dialectical Materialism, London / New York 2012: Verso. 
Hereinafter cited as SZLN.
25 It is here that Meillassoux introduces the distinction between potentiality and chance or con-
tingency and virtuality. The former marks the actualization within the framework of a given 
set of cases (throwing a die actualizes one of the possible and pre-existing cases or numbers 
turning up), the latter mark an actualization which generates its own possibility within the 
act of actualization. Cf. QMPV, pp. 231-232. I stick here to the classical terminology only for 
the sake of brevity. What I refer to as contingency is what Meillassoux calls virtuality. One ad-
ditional remark on this topic: By introducing this distinction, in my view, Meillassoux reacts 
to a criticism first formulated by Ray Brassier which he framed in the following way: Although 
Meillassoux seeks to formulate how to think something “anterior” to thought (or the existence 
of consciousness or human beings) and thereby seeks to think the primary quality of things 
in themselves (i.e. the absolute), he still relies – with the very term of “anteriority” – on some 
sort of ‘objective’ conception of time that was already refuted by Albert Einstein’s theory of 
relativity (and is thus not up to the scientific standard of its own time). (Cf. Ray Brassier, Nihil 
Unbound. Enlightenment and Extinction, Basingstoke 2007: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 58ff.) I 
read Meillassoux’s emphasis of – in my terms – contingency (preceding existence) as an an-
swer to this criticism. It is not that there is an objective time as a constant which would enable 
us to conceive of ‘something’ that would lie ‘prior’ to or is ‘anterior’ to our own existence, as 
this would amount to something existent that precedes our existence; it is rather that this 
anteriority persists in the very possibility that everything could change at any instant and 
thereby what is “anterior” is a may-be(ing). Thereby Meillassoux seems to try to eliminate any 
‘objective’ time, i.e. any form of chronology, since even the emergence of time would then be 
a contingent event.
26 I here refer to an article by Peter Hallward discussing Meillassoux’s After Finitude. The criti-
cism he articulates is profound and I think it cannot be refuted all too easily. Cf. Peter Hall-
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implementation of an absolute necessity), that is, the coming-into-being of a 
yet inexistent God,27 or even the absence of any change till the very end of time. 
ward, Anything is Possible. A Reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude, in: ST, pp. 130-
141. Hereinafter cited as PWAP.
27 I consider this one to be one of the weakest points in Meillassoux’s argument, although it is 
presented as being a consistent consequence of his overall proposal. One simple first version 
of this argument runs as follows: If (1.) we know and can demonstrate that God does not exist 
(i.e. there is no set of all sets, as Cantor has proven), and if (2.) everything is contingent and 
therefore possible, and we (3.) have demonstrated that we cannot limit the range of what is 
possible, we can infer from this (4.) that a God might – although inexistent right now –come 
into being at one point in the future. The problem with this argument is that Meillassoux also 
links it to a, in some sense, renewed theodicy (i.e. ethical) discussion. His claim is that his 
phrasing can present a solution to the following philosophical fiasco: a.) either God does not 
exist and the contingent quality of all human life of being finite is nothing but a meaning-
less, contingent fact, that is to say, there is no (meaningful) explanation whatsoever for the 
human condition. This amounts to claiming that human life is immanently meaningless. Or: 
b.) There is a God but then he is the greatest sadist of them all, as every day he enjoys the 
consequences of the very finitude of all human life. As b.) is logically ruled out and option 
a.) needs to be avoided for ethical reasons, as Meillassoux argues, the only consistent solu-
tion to this problem for him is: c.) There might be a contingent emergence of a God at some 
point in the future which will redeem all human beings from their finitude (although he is not 
responsible for it). Upon coming into existence he will take back all the injustices that man-
kind has suffered beforehand. This position implies believing “in God because he does not 
exist.” Although this “has never been systematically defended,” now “it […] has been done.” 
Cf. Quentin Meillassoux, Excerpts from L’inexistence divine, in: Graham Harman, Quentin Mei-
llassoux. Philosophy in the Making, Edinburgh 2011: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 175-238, 
esp. pp. 225ff and p. 238. See also: Quentin Meillassoux, Deuil à venir, dieu à venir, in: Critique, 
No. 704/705, January / February 2006, pp. 105-115. To formulate my disagreement in very few 
words: What if one simply does not accept the coordinates of the dilemma Meillassoux out-
lines? What if the meaninglessness of human life as such is not the problem (as much as its 
finitude is not a veritable problem)? What if the problem does not lie in the fact that we are 
finite beings and our existence is thus doomed to be meaningless, but rather that even this 
finitude can be perceived as non-totalizing, that is to say: ‘something’ can happen to us that 
creates desires which drive us to act as if we were non-finite? Might not the best – and perhaps 
cheesiest – example be love, which begins from utter contingency and generates a form of 
‘salvation’ by creating a whole new world without any need of a coming-God that will save us? 
I here side again with Adrian Johnston, who pointed out that Meillassoux’s position implies a 
“non-metaphysical theology.” (AJHR, p. 94) My scepticism concerning his argument is based 
upon my even greater scepticism toward a revival of theological arguments in a rationalist, 
non-metaphysical framework. To quote Johnston again on this point: “Meillassoux can be 
viewed as an inversion of Žižek, as an anti-Žižek: whereas Žižek tries to smuggle atheism into 
Christianity via the immanent critique of a Hegelian dialectical interpretation of Christian-
ity for the sake of a progressive radical leftist politics of Communism, Meillassoux, whether 
knowingly or unknowingly, smuggles idealist religiosity back into materialist atheism via a 
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6. The Age of Scientists. Totalizing Un-Totalizability
Everything is contingent. This is the speculative realist slogan par excellence. All 
that is and all that can be is contingent and can thus change at any instant. Ev-
erything is contingent and hence anything is possible. Since any-thing is subject 
to the (only) necessity of contingency.28 This is the primary quality of everything 
that is, its condition of possibility. Contingency is the condition of possibility 
and this is a completely non-metaphysical and consistent claim, since this tran-
scendental (contingency) no longer even implies existence at it seems. Every-
thing is contingent and hence anything is possible since contingency is the logical 
anterior to any existence whatsoever. 
But this slogan also indicates in my view the most problematic aspect of the 
speculative realist enterprise. If the mathematician Georg Cantor proved that 
there are infinitely different sizes of infinity and if this very proof becomes a cru-
cial moment in the speculative realist argument, via its insistence that there can 
never be a set of all possibilities of (possible) change(s that might emerge) – that 
is to say, contingency like infinities cannot be totalized – the speculative realist 
at the same time claims that everything that is, all that there is, is contingent. 
Everything is contingent.29 It is precisely the assumption of such an “everything” 
that can be read as the marker of the problem.30 To put it as concisely as pos-
non-dialectical ‘materialism’.”(AJHR, p. 113) More on the non-dialectical element of Meillas-
soux’s thought will follow shortly below.
28 To state this again explicitly: This is due to the (absolute) equation of being and may-be(ing). 
Thus, what is the absolute being of all things is that they may-be different than they are. Being 
qua being is what being may-be qua may-being.
29 Here one might again be reminded of a move common to Martin Heidegger’s thought. Just 
think of him referring to “being in its totality / beings in a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen)”. Al-
though this might not indicate that for him there is a totality of beings (all the beings (Seiendes) 
that are), it still refers to a whole of being (Sein). This simply implies that there is a whole at all. 
For comments on rendering this phrase in English, see: Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of 
Thinking, ed. by Frank Schalow, Dordrecht / Heidelberg / London / New York 2011: Springer, p. 
33ff. Badiou somewhere remarked once that Heidegger is simply mistaken, taken by the very 
standards of his own thought, to speak of something like beings in whole/being-in-its-totality. 
My argument against Meillassoux attempts to repeat this gesture of criticism.
30 Yet, Meillassoux seems to explicitly advocate a position that Žižek already linked to the 
Lacanian notion of the “non-all”: “Quentin Meillassoux has outlined the contours of a post-
metaphysical materialist ontology whose basic premise is the Cantorian multiplicity of infini-
ties which cannot be totalized into an all-encompassing One. Such an ontology of non-All 
asserts radical contingency: not only are there no laws which hold with necessity, every law 
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sible, with this (implicit) move the speculative realist is guilty of a one-sided, 
non-dialectical generalization of un-totalizability. 
One might also formulate this criticism in different terms: The speculative real-
ist argues firstly that contingency precedes existence, yet he has to claim that, 
secondly, everything is contingent (hence possible), and thereby he, thirdly, as-
serts that there is something like an ‘everything’ and that it can be best compre-
hended as being contingent. He thus claims two things at the same time that do 
not consistently come together: Contingency precedes existence and contingency 
is an attribute of everything that already is, i.e. existence precedes contingency 
(contingency being an attribute of any existence whatsoever).31 Put differently: 
if contingency precedes existence, there is an existence, or more precisely a (nec-
essary) being of contingency which thus precedes contingency. Even if this is 
inverted again and rendered in retroactive terms, one ends up with the following 
result: Contingency becomes another name for everything (i.e. the necessary be-
ing in its totality). Or again differently: non-totalizability is all there is. To put my 
criticism in Hegelian terms: The totalization of untotalizability directly implies 
an abstract notion of contingency. This is why I think Peter Hallward is right 
when he critically states that there is a conflation of (the ontological and the 
ontic) layer in the speculative realist’s work. He applies Cantor’s idea of different 
larger infinites to our material universe, its laws, as if this idea were the “royal 
is in itself contingent, it can be overturned at any moment.” (SZLN, pp. 227–229) I find Žižek’s 
reading compelling and I clearly see that this is a solid reconstruction of what Meillassoux 
aims at. Yet Žižek himself later counters Meillassoux’s very understanding of the “non-all” (by 
preferring a masculine interpretation of the non-all as relying on a constitutive exception) in a 
way that I believe to be close to my own. (Cf. SZLN, p. 369)
31 The speculative realist thereby seems to miss the Hegelian logic of retroactivity. Contingency 
can only be logically anterior to existence if there already is existence. Contingency is the ret-
roactive anteriority to any existence because there is existence (thus it is not contingency that 
generates existence, but existence generates insight into the very anteriority of contingency 
and hence already determines contingency). In any other sense the thesis that contingency 
precedes existence embodies nothing but a mistaken logical inference, since claiming that 
before existence there is only contingency entails stating that there is ‘something’ before con-
tingency, i.e. the being of contingency (which obviously cannot be explained via contingency, 
this is why this being is necessary). Even if retroactivity might become included in the specu-
lative realist’s framework, the problem is not that easily done away with. The ultimate nega-
tive version (there is nothing but negativity preceding existence) is discussed at length in the 
present volume by Adrian Johnston under the inventive label of the “myth of the non-given.” 
Cf. Adrian Johnston, Reflections of a Rotten Nature: Hegel, Lacan and Material Negativity in the 
present volume.
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road to the in itself.” (PWAP, 139) Simply put: such an approach lacks the neces-
sary concreteness to actually account for the contingent change it conjures. I am 
tempted to contend that this problem – let us call this the “problem of abstrac-
tion” – is related to one crucial implication which I have already marked in pass-
ing several times. The speculative realist – legitimately – insists on contingency 
and rationality against any version of metaphysical irrationalism and thereby 
seeks to invent yet another version of the destruction of metaphysics. Yet, when 
he sees the most crucial outcome of a metaphysical position in the ignorance 
toward the impact (and content) of scientific statements and thereby toward the 
fact that science thinks, the speculative realist plays out a renewed, different 
approach to science, that is to say, to (scientific) knowledge. We are, to actualize 
a name coined by Alain Badiou, in the age of the scientists.32
We can think the absolute (contingent) being of all things because we can know 
that they can be different. Starting from this primacy of knowledge against 
metaphysics – which relies on an irrational drive to not know (what it knows), 
the speculative realist manoeuvres himself into a problem: If knowledge be-
comes the crucial category, this is because the knowledge of contingency is itself 
a contingent knowledge and it knows this. But this sort of reflexive knowledge 
of contingency produces the problem that the very reason of its reflexivity ob-
scures that this very reason eschews any concrete conception of change actually 
(although contingently) occurring. The contingently existent – yet absolute – 
knowledge of contingency makes it – surprisingly – impossible to have a theory 
of the revision of knowledge. Adrian Johnston phrased this in a pointed, yet 
polemical way: “In terms of scientific practice, Meillassoux’s speculative ma-
terialism, centered on the omnipotent sovereign capriciousness of an absolute 
time of ultimate contingency, either makes no difference whatsoever (i.e., self-
respecting scientists ignore it for a number of very good theoretical and practi-
32 I obviously refer here to Badiou’s famous reference to the “age of poets.” See: Alain Badiou, 
Manifesto for Philosophy, Albany 1999: State University of New York Press, pp. 69–78. I was 
tempted to begin the following passage of the article by also re-actualizing Badiou’s opening 
formulations regarding the age of poets. This would have read like this: “In the period that 
opens up after Badiou, a period in which philosophy is most often sutured either to the poetic 
condition or threatened with disappearance completely, science assumed certain functions of 
philosophy’s function. […] Yet, the science and scientists we are speaking of are neither all the 
science nor all the scientists, but rather those whose work is immediately recognizable as a 
work of thought and for whom science is, at the very locus where philosophy falters, a locus of 
knowledge wherein a proposition about being and about time is enacted.”
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cal reasons) or licenses past scientific mistakes and/or present bad science be-
ing sophistically conjured away by cheap-and-easy appeals to hyper-Chaos. As 
regards the second prong of this discomforting fork, one should try imagining a 
particle physicist whose experimental results fail to be replicated by other par-
ticle physicists protesting that, in the intervening time between his/her experi-
ments and their subsequent re-enactment by others, an instantaneous contin-
gent shift in the causal mechanisms of nature in itself intervened. Why should 
this physicist correct him/her-self when he/she conveniently can blame his/her 
epistemological errors on the speculated ontological reality of hyper-Chaos?” 
(AJHR, p. 101) In some sense, I contend that to begin with knowledge of unto-
talizability necessarily implies a totalization of this very untotalizability.33 Even 
the knowledge of the absolute (contingent) character of all things may-be just a 
little bit too objective. A too objective may-be.
The consequences of this non-dialectical totalization are not only problematic, 
they are multifold. I would just like to mention a few things that seem to be 
unavoidable when one generalizes or hypostatizes (the) untotalizability (of the 
possible): With it there is one order of all things which cannot be changed (un-
less it changes by the very principle of this very order, which at the same time 
means that there is no change at all). For, there is one necessity that is the ne-
cessity of contingency. This implies that there is precisely not what the whole 
project aimed to develop: possibilities of change.34 But this means – and I think 
33 The argument I am putting forward here could also be phrased in different terms: As soon 
as one starts without the distinction of (objective) knowledge and (subjective) truth, one ends 
up endorsing some sort of objectivism. This to me seems to also be the case with Meillassoux. 
This is why I take it to be no surprise that he cannot account for any concrete change actually 
occurring (a revision of knowledge, for example). He ends up losing what he aimed to achieve. 
I think that against this one-sided approach it needs to be argued that a revision of knowledge 
can only be a consequence of something other than knowledge: truth. Yet, truth is not an 
objective nor an abstract category, but a procedural one that implies the concrete re-working 
of concrete and situational knowledges as one of its consequences. Furthermore, it needs to 
be stated that a truth not only produces something like a revision of knowledge, but it does so 
not by solely indicating the untotalizability of a given situation, it rather links untotalizability 
(opening unforeseeable possibilities within a world) and an act of totalization (which Badiou 
names “forcing”) together. For more on this, see: Frank Ruda, For Badiou. Idealism Without 
Idealism (forthcoming).
34 Put differently: this is also the reason why there is no real theory of the event in this version 
of speculative realism. For this, see: Tzuchien Tho, An Interview with Alain Badiou, in: Alain 
Badiou, The Rational Kernel of Hegelian Dialectic, Melbourne 2011: re-press, pp. 104 ff.
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this is the most fundamental problem – that there is simply no real event (with 
concrete and not immediately universal consequences that change the world), 
or at least there is always one and the same form of (the contingent) event. 
Why? Because the one and only thing which is not contingent is the necessity 
of contingency that makes everything be contingent. And one necessary effect 
of this necessity is the totalization of contingency. For the speculative realist, 
everything is contingent and thus everything necessary: contingency becomes 
hyper-determinism.35
An anecdote of one of the greatest thinkers of contingency – which was recently 
brought up by Alenka Zupančič36 in a similar context – can here outline a possi-
ble answer to the speculative realist’s dilemma: G.W.F: Hegel notes after visiting 
the Alps in Bern – his friends wanted to convince him of their beauty and sub-
lime character – the following into his travel journal: “Neither the eye nor the 
imagination finds on these formless masses a point on which the former could 
repose with appreciation or on which the latter could find an activity or a game. 
The mineralogist alone finds material to risk insufficient speculations about the 
revolutions of these mountains. Reason finds in the thought of the endurance 
of these mounts, or in this sort of sublimity that one assigns to them, nothing 
impressive or anything that would extort astonishment or admiration. The sight 
of these eternally dead masses did not give me anything but the uniform, and 
when protracted boring, impression: That’s the way it is. [Es ist so].”37 One can 
and should here learn from Hegel. And that which can be learned is that there 
is nothing to think in the subject-independent nature – nature is nothing but 
stupid38 – except that there is nothing to think in it. One can thus learn from 
35 Without any question, the first to have demonstrated this is Lorenzo Chiesa, to whom I am 
also indebted for much discussion that helped to clarify the arguments formulated above. Cf. 
his brilliant: Lorenzo Chiesa, Hyper-Structuralism’s Necessity of Contingency, in: $, Journal of 
the Jan Van Eyck Circle For Lacanian Ideology Critique, Vol. 3 (2010), pp. 159–176. 
36 Cf. Alenka Zupančič: Realism in Psychoanalysis (unpublished typescript).
37 G.W.F. Hegel, Auszüge aus dem Tagebuch der Reise in die Berner Oberalpen (1796), in: Werke, 
Vol. 2, Frankfurt am Main 1986, Suhrkamp, p. 618.
38 Hegel’s philosophy of nature, as under-appreciated as it might be, is one of the greatest 
achievements in his philosophical system. The reason for this is that as nature is simply what 
it is without any reason for it being the way it is, it contains a complete theory of contingency. 
In one of his most impressive texts Dieter Henrich pointed out that for Hegel nature is simply 
another name for contingency. (Cf. Dieter Henrich, in: Hegel im Kontext, Frankfurt a. M. 2010: 
Suhrkamp, pp. 157–186.) To refer here to a simple example: There is no reason whatsoever why 
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Hegel that the necessity of contingency (“That is”; “Es ist”) is itself contingent 
(“the way it is”; “so”). If one thereby (dialectically) thinks the contingency of 
the necessity of contingency, one understands that not everything, not all that 
there is, is contingent but it is rather not-all that is contingent (which to simplify 
it to the utmost is simply not-all). Hegel is here, as always, right. Also as regards 
the speculative realist. If one seeks to think the things as they are in themselves, 
one has to commence with thinking – even if this sounds a bit uncouth: Es ist 
so; that’s the way it is.39
7. Speculative Realism’s Lenin and Stalin: from Speculative 
Contingency to Realist Financial Speculation
Quentin Meillassoux‘s book After Finitude, in which he presented most of the 
arguments discussed above, has been said to entail a comparable theoretical 
job as Lenin’s 1908 Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. It has been claimed that 
it is an actualized version of this book for the twenty-first century. This very 
comparison brought up by Slavoj Žižek40 implies in my mind a question to be 
raised here. If the speculative realist takes the position of a certain Lenin, who 
then is his Marx and who is – maybe even more daring – this Lenin’s Stalin, if 
there is one? The first question might be answered immediately and without any 
problem: It is Alain Badiou.41 It is he who first referred to Georg Cantor when at-
tempting to propose a fundamental theory of any thinkable situation, proposed 
a renewed stance on the relationship between (philosophical) thought and sci-
ence, and he affirmed unforeseeable events. But let me leave the well-known 
details of this answer aside here and immediately turn to the second question: 
there are, say, 878 sorts of apes and not 888. The only thing to be understood here is that there 
is nothing to understand.
39 One might here also use a word by Lacan by modifying it a bit. Lacan once said that not only 
the beggar who thinks that he is a king is mad, but also the king who seriously thinks that he 
is a king and thinks that his symbolic mandate is grounded in his natural properties. Does not 
the position of the speculative realist force us to rephrase this saying? I am a bit tempted to 
claim that it is today not only the idealist who thinks he is a materialist that is mad, but also 
the materialist who thinks that he is one. 
40 Cf. Slavoj Žižek, An Answer to Two Questions, in: Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Politi-
cal Transformation, Evanston 2009, Northwestern University Press, pp. 174–230.
41 This is even quite consistent with Badiou’s own assessment of the contemporary situation 
(cf. footnote 1). Also, it is a well-known fact that Badiou was the mentor of the speculative real-
ist in question. From such a perspective this also means: a new Marx is amongst us. 
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Who is this Lenin’s Stalin? But why this analogy-game? Because if something 
‘of Lenin’ can be grasped in a perverted way in Stalin,42 the same might hold for 
the speculative realist’s enterprise. And astonishingly this question can indeed 
be answered. For there is someone who in some sense re-wrote Stalin’s 1926 The 
Economic Situation of the Soviet Union and the Policy of the Party.43 It is Elie Ay-
ache, a former options market champion, who proposed the application of cer-
tain speculative realist insights to the real-real world, which is to say the finan-
cial market system. His book, entitled the Blank Swan: The End of Probability,44 
attempts to revamp the view on specifically economical science – as speculative 
realism seeks to revamp the perspective on science in general – by applying 
the idea of untotalizable possibilities, i.e. of (ontological) contingency to the 
very conceptual understanding of the market. In some sense, this book dares to 
propose an economic policy (i.e. economic theory based on speculative realist 
claims) for speculative realists. Maybe there are people that wondered what to 
do financially – say, stock-market wise – when being a speculative realist. And 
if there are none yet, then some might come into existence in the near or distant 
future. So: there is indeed an answer to this.
As strange – and highly controversial – as this might seem, what Ayache – as 
a speculative financial realist – claims is consistently argued if one accepts the 
framework of the delineated speculative realist.45 Ayache’s argument goes like 
42 I am here thinking of the diagnosis that Stalin(ism) presents a literally perverted form of the 
universalist kernel of Lenin. If there was anyone who was addressed within the revolutionary 
framework of Lenin (this is why world revolution was indeed an issue), it is precisely anyone 
who became a possible victim of state terror under Stalin. This Stalinist perversion still relies 
on the universal core of the previous Leninist position that made the former possible in the 
first place.
43 Cf. J.V. Stalin, The Economic Situation of the Soviet Union and the Policy of the Party, in: 
Works, Vol. 8. January-November 1926, Moscow 1954: Foreign Language Publishing House, 
pp. 123–157.
44 Elie Ayache, The Blank Swan: The End of Probability, Sussex 2010: John Wiley & Sons. Here-
inafter cited as EABS. I owe the reference to this quite peculiar project to Nina Power. Ayache 
worked from 1990-5 as an “options market-maker” at LIFFE (London International Financial 
Futures and Options Exchange) and before that from 1987–90 at MATIF (Marché à Terme Inter-
national de France). Cf. EABS, p. XV.
This book is an – acknowledged – reaction to the book by Nassim Nicholas Taleb that deals 
with highly improbable events, see his: The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 
Allen Lane 2007: Random House.
45 Let us put it like this: From time to time it can be quite telling to take a look at the children (i.e. 
pupils) that certain (founding) fathers (of a philosophical trend or tendency) have produced. 
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this: Any form of probability theory proposes defined and separately existing 
states of the world in order to then apply stochastic calculation and reasoning 
to it. Yet, what can be grasped from the very notion of probability – as it has 
been modelled philosophically46 – is that it is itself derived from the real char-
acter of equity exchanges.47 The attempt to calculate how “prizes” go up and 
down on the market seems to be able to rely on a stable concatenation of causes 
and effects, but the market as such does not really allow, according to Ayache, 
for inferring such lawfulness.48 Simply put: “[b]ecause the market is composed 
of numbers (prizes), we feel confident applying probability to it” – but we are 
mistaken and follow an irrational belief in doing so. Why is that? Because one 
might think a prize occurring on the market is the product of a series of more or 
less interdependent and more or less stable elements influencing one another. 
Yet, for Ayache the market is as the world is for the speculative realist, i.e. not 
made of stable coordinates or states with which one can calculate. This is why, 
for example, as one might state, a crisis cannot be predicted, it just happens. 
The slogan for this realist speculative position is: “Each day brings a new prize 
and a new market” (EAEP) – a somehow completely, even if actually unchanged 
“new state of the market-world.”49 (EABS, XX)
Thus – let’s call him like this – the realist speculator opposes the widespread 
probabilist economic reason with its (metaphysical and irrational) belief in 
stable states of the world and possible calculations of the future (tendencies, 
etc.) and draws the following conclusion: If contingency is absolute and the very 
existence of the world is a contingent event, the market – as our world – also 
46 At one point Ayache refers to the work of Ian Hacking. The most elaborate account to the best 
of my knowledge can be found in his The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of 
Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference, Cambridge 2006: Cambridge 
University Press.
47 As Ayache summarizes in a brief article that presents his major claims: “probability is in fact 
philosophically defined after price.” It “is then defined as a sequence of outcomes that are 
insensitive to gambling systems. ‘Banker’ and ‘gambler’, precisely the personae who deal with 
money and prices, not with probabilities.”Cf. Elie Ayache, The End of Probability, At: http://
www.ito33.com/sites/default/files/articles/1011_ayache.pdf. Hereinafter cited as EAEP.
48 Here it seems to be overly clear that this project cannot but argue for abolishing the Marxist 
idea of a critique of political economy. 
49 As will be well known to the reader, it is hard to imagine a wording that goes more against 
the position of Alain Badiou, as he insisted over and over again that “market” is precisely 
the name of the complete absence of a world (and its implied symbolic positions). The realist 
speculator hence takes a position as far from Badiou as Stalin took from Marx. 
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has to be conceived of as being a contingent event, “an event” (EABS, pp. 61-87) 
that does not abolish contingency put perpetuates it. The market renews itself 
every day since its stability or instability is nothing but a result of the absolute 
character of all things. A throw of the prize will never abolish chance. The realist 
speculator thus repeats the speculative realist gesture par excellence of turning 
the very formulation of a problem (how to predict market dynamics, prevent cri-
ses, etc.?) into its solution. The market is just another instance where the move 
of positivizing ontologization can be applied. That is to say, one has to draw 
all the conclusions from the fact that the market can change every day, hour, 
minute, or second. Because all it is is a concatenation of contingent prizes that 
interfere with each other. But what are prizes? Prizes are contingent claims that 
produce a difference. A claim on something contingently appears and interacts, 
and is exchanged with other contingent claims. The very medium of this contin-
gent exchange of contingencies is the market. This is why, according to the real-
ist speculator, what holds for the market is: “Don’t ask why or how. This is […] 
the definition of the market […].” (EAEP)50 Do not ask why or how, for the solu-
tion to your very question is and will always be contingency. Contingency is to 
be blamed if you lose; contingency is to be thanked if you win in the contingent 
games of contingencies.51 At least one thing seems to be clear: it is contingency 
that will always and forever be responsible (for everything).
It seems as if the wording of Adrian Johnston concerning the speculative real-
ist applies also to the realist speculator. Johnston claimed that the speculative 
realist develops a position that somehow resembles “an easily defended (but 
empty) fortress.” (AJHR, p. 111) This harsh criticism is based upon the follow-
ing observation: “After relying on the realm of the reasonable, it tries to evade 
further critical evaluation at the level of the reasonable by attempting to escape 
into the confined enclosure of the strictly rational.” (AJHR, p. 111.) In my view, 
with regard to the realist speculator a slightly different version of the same criti-
cism can and should be applied. Since he also relies on the non-metaphysical 
and rationalist – i.e. speculative realist – claim regarding the necessity of con-
50 I leave some – rather deconstructivist– undertones aside here. For, Ayache claims that what 
holds for the market also holds for the very definition of writing. Cf. EABS, pp. 87–122.
51 As much as this position presents itself as a new position with regard to market dynamics, 
this has already been the position of what Hegel called the “rich rabble”. For its relation to 
contingency, see: Frank Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble. An Investigation into Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 
London / New York 2011: Continuum, pp. 35–74.
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tingency (as the only absolute character of all things and laws) and he also 
shares the methodology of inverting a problem into its solution (i.e. positivized 
ontologization). Yet, the outcome of the realist speculation is even more prob-
lematic than the outcome of the speculative realist’s manoeuvres. Somehow the 
easily defended fortress is not even empty anymore; it seems to have become 
inhabited by investment bankers. Rendered differently, the realist speculator’s 
position, i.e. defending that there is no reason whatsoever for why things are 
the way they are is nothing but apologetic52 of the state things are in right now. It 
is apologetic as only contingency is responsible. Thereby the realist speculator 
abolishes responsibility tout court and if ultimately the market can change at 
any instant for no reason whatsoever his position abolishes history. 
If anything meaningful is to be learned from speculative realism’s Stalin, it might 
be that its Lenin already runs the risk of rationally and consistently defending 
a position that places all its emphasis on a totalization of untotalizable contin-
gency and can by this very move very easily become an apologist (for the present 
state of things). Over-accentuating contingency as the only relevant ontological 
category (relating thought and science) can thus easily come dangerously close 
to becoming a very useful servant to all those (ideological) positions that actu-
ally enjoy business as usual. In order to prevent this from happening it does not 
seem enough to insist on going against what happened with Kant (and attacking 
the concept of critique). To prevent the renewal of the rationalist “critical criti-
cism” (Marx) that ends up in abstraction, today it seems that the task lies rather 
in renewing the very notion of critique in its relation to concrete situations and 
practices (including, inter alia, science). Either one abolishes concrete critique 
tout court (i.e. critical criticism) or one begins to be critical of critique itself (i.e. 
one takes a meta-critical position). The latter work still needs to be undertaken. 
52 One here might be reminded of the following joke: “An indigent client who had been injured 
in an accident went looking for a lawyer to represent him pro bono. One lawyer told him that 
he would take the case on contingency. When the client asked what ‘contingency’ was, the 
lawyer replied, “If I don’t win your lawsuit, I don’t get anything. If I do win your lawsuit, you 
don’t get anything.”
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